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Canada’s 2 percent inflation targeting program works pretty well – 
but could targeting the price level work even better, especially when
inflation and the price level might not be perfectly observed?
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MONETARY POLICYThis Commentary argues that there are good reasons to believe that the Bank of
Canada does not perfectly observe the “true” inflation rate and price level when
implementing policy, perhaps as a result of measurement errors or conceptual
difficulties in defining these indicators. 
The Consumer Price Index is, at best, an approximate measure of the true cost of
living in Canada. The need to rely on imperfect information affects the relative
merits of inflation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PLT).
Up to now, the literature has suggested that PLT might be inferior to IT when
inflation is subject to observational errors. However, this view is valid only when the
central bank is oblivious to the presence of observational errors. Furthermore, the
costs of ignoring observational errors can be as important as those at stake in the
choice between IT, which does not take into account past deviations from the target,
and PLT, which does.
When the central bank acknowledges that inflation and the price level are not
perfectly observed and attempts to make allowance for this fact, a PLT regime might
be superior to an IT regime, provided that the general public understands how such
a regime works and bases its own decisions on that understanding.
Accordingly, the fact that inflation and price-level measures are indeed subject to the
presence of observational errors might, in fact, be an additional argument in favour
of PLT.
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inflation targeting (IT) in Canada
is a remarkable success story. 
There has been a considerable reduction in the level
and volatility of inflation since the Bank of Canada
adopted inflation targeting in 1991 (Figure 1). Since
mid-1992, inflation – measured as the year-over-year
change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) – has
remained stable and close to its target of 2 percent. In
fact, inflation expectations appear well anchored at
that level. Importantly, the successful stabilization of
inflation has not come at the cost of more volatile
economic activity. In fact, the Canadian experience
shows that it is possible to stabilize inflation over the
medium run while still maintaining sufficient
flexibility to mitigate short-term fluctuations
elsewhere in the economy.
Despite this success, it is at least a theoretical
possibility that an alternative policy framework –
namely price-level targeting (PLT) – could have led
to even better economic outcomes. Research on the
topic has resulted in a series of compelling theoretical
arguments showing why PLT might be superior to
IT. Some of these arguments suggest that PLT might
be more effective in preventing and dealing with
deflationary situations when the nominal overnight
interest rate approaches zero. Clearly, contemplating
the potential benefits of PLT is particularly relevant
in the current environment.
Given that the current IT regime has been
successful in many respects, at least historically, it is
particularly important that the actual merits of any
alternative be thoroughly and rigorously investigated.
As the saying goes, “If it ain’t broken, why fix it?” 
In particular, we need to be convinced that the
theoretical environment in which these results are
derived is characterized by properties that would
matter in practice.
What if the inflation and the price level are
not observed in practice?
Comparisons of IT and PLT have paid little
attention to the idea that the inflation and price level
relevant for monetary policy might not be perfectly
observed. In fact, a central bank should care about
the true underlying changes in the public well-being
that stem from overall changes in the cost of living.
Because of the difficulties associated with translating
the concept of cost of living into an operational
definition, any price index might be merely a useful,
but imperfect proxy of what the central bank should
be stabilizing.
Existing arguments in the literature suggest 
that PLT might be inferior to IT when inflation is
observed imperfectly, since transitory errors in
inflation imply persistent errors in the price level. In
that case, targeting an imperfect measure of the price
level could result in the central bank responding to
errors that would introduce additional and persistent
fluctuations in the economy that would, in turn,
reduce economic well-being.
In this Commentary, I argue that there are good
reasons to believe that the central bank might be
currently implementing policy based on an unrealistic
price level, perhaps as a result of calculation errors
or conceptual difficulties in defining this measure.
However, I also argue that when the central bank
acknowledges that inflation and the price level are
not perfectly observed, PLT is likely to be superior
to an IT regime. Thus, the presence of measurement
errors might be an additional argument in favour of
PLT. But ultimately, as for most of the arguments in
favour of PLT, this conclusion relies on how the
public forms its expectations. Before discussing the
role of imperfect information, it is useful to describe
more explicitly IT and PLT, their differences and
the existing arguments concerning why one might
be superior to the other.
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Figure 1: Monthly CPI inflation in Canada from 1961–2008 (Year-on-year percentage change)
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Figure 2: Price level, Targeted Path and Confidence Bands
Sources: Statistics Canada (CPI Level) and author’s calculations.
Target 
Inflation 
RateThe Difference between Inflation
Targeting and Price-Level Targeting1
A key feature of inflation targeting is that it does
not require the central bank to do anything to
correct past mistakes. Bygones are simply bygones.
For instance, if inflation is unexpectedly higher
than the target at some point – as in March 2003 –
the current policy framework requires the central
bank only to bring inflation back to 2 percent over
the near term. But this overshooting of the target
implies that the price level will remain higher than
what was expected prior to this surprise, even after
inflation returns to its 2 percent target. As these
surprises accumulate over time, the price level can,
in principle, wander far away from its expected
path. As a result, in a successful inflation-targeting
regime, where average inflation is on target, the
actual price level in some years can be considerably
different from a forecast that assumed prices would
increase exactly by 2 percent every year over these
years. Uncertainty about the price level over a long
horizon can thus be considerable.
This is illustrated in Figure 2. The dotted line
displays the level of the Consumer Price Index since
December 1992. The solid line displays the price
level that would have ensued if the Bank of Canada
had never missed its announced target for inflation,
which was 3 percent in December 1992, linearly
declining to 2 percent until December 1995 and
thereafter. The solid line thus represents the best
forecast of the price level that one would have
produced in December 1992 for the next 16 years,
believing that the Bank of Canada would never
miss its target. 
As can be seen from this figure, the two price-level
paths differ considerably. The actual price path has
been systematically below that which would have
been predicted in December 1992. That is, during
this period, inflation undershot target more often
than it overshot it. For instance, in February 1999,
the price level in Canada was more than 6 percent
below what it would have been if inflation had been
on target since December 1992.
In contrast, if the Bank of Canada had successfully
targeted a price-level path increasing at the rate of the
pre-announced inflation target, the actual price level
(dotted line) should have been fluctuating around
the targeted path (solid line). The deviations of the
actual price level from the targeted path would have
been transitory and would have averaged zero.
Targeting a 2 percent price-level path would have
required the Bank of Canada to engineer inflation
higher than 2 percent whenever inflation had fallen
unexpectedly below 2 percent during that 16-year
period. In short, under a price-level targeting regime,
the central bank needs to correct past mistakes.
Bygones are no longer bygones. For instance,
throughout 1994, inflation was below 0.3 percent
(except for January when it was 1.3 percent). If the
Bank of Canada had been targeting the price level, it
would have had to allow inflation to be above its
target – which was between 2.3 percent and 2.7
percent in that year – for a sufficiently long period to
offset this undershooting of the target. But as we can
see from Figures 1 and 2, it did not.
The calculations in Figure 2 assume that Canada
was under an IT regime as of December 1992. It is
important to note that the importance of the
departures from the hypothetical price path depends
on when one thinks that the IT regime started.
Officially, it began in December 1991 with an initial
target of 4 percent that was to be brought down to 2
percent by December 1995.
However, based on official announcements, it is
more difficult to identify the precise announced path
for the inflation target during the regime’s first year.
This is why my discussion starts in December 1992.
But some people would argue that it is really only
after December 1995, when the announced long-
term numerical target of 2 percent was achieved, that
Canada was truly under an IT regime. Starting
Figure 2 from December 1995, instead, would make
the actual path of the price level look much closer to
the hypothetical 2 percent target path.2
1 Although I will not spell out a model explicitly in the discussion that follows, the benchmark that I have in mind is in the general class of New
Keynesian models where price rigidities are a central feature.
2 Both Parkin (2009, Fig 3) and Robson (2009, Fig 11) plot such charts.
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Since the existence of an IT regime should not be
defined by the numerical value of a target but by
the fact that a central bank is officially committed
to such a target, it is far from obvious that the
experience before 1995 can be simply ignored. To
the contrary, since part of the relative merit of PLT
over IT lies in its ability to better anchor inflation
expectations, the transition period leading to
December 1995 seems particularly informative for
this comparison. If the public believed the
announced inflation target was realistic, the price-
level path represented in Figure 2 fairly represents
the best forecast of inflation as of December 1992.
That remains the case, irrespective of the fact that it
is only after December 1995 that the target had
settled to 2 percent.3
Would price-level targeting have led to
better economic outcomes in Canada?
In attempting to answer this question, one might
be tempted to infer from Figure 2 that no matter
the potential merit of PLT, it is not likely that the
actual economic outcomes would have been much
better. The realized price level was, after all, not that
far away from what would have been the targeted
price path. By 2008, the gap between the realized
price level and predicted PLT would have
narrowed. As already discussed, moreover, this
conclusion would be even more tempting if Figure
2 started instead in December 1995.
Unfortunately, the answer is not so simple. First,
even though the price level seems not far from what
would have been the targeted price level under PLT,
the deviations between the two paths have been
extremely persistent. It took about 15 years for the
price level to close the gap, which it started to
widen again in the very last part of the sample.
Second, the fact that the realized price path is not
far from the 2 percent price-level path does not
mean that the amount of ex ante uncertainty in
December 1992 about what the price level would
be over the next 16 years was small. Achieving this
price level might only have been a matter of luck,
for  there is nothing in IT that would have
guaranteed this outcome or that would have kept
the actual price level close to the 2 percent path. 
The confidence intervals plotted in Figure 2
illustrate this point. The widest confidence interval
represents an estimate of the statistical uncertainty
on the expected price-level path associated with an
IT regime where there is no attempt to correct past
mistakes. These intervals assume an IT regime
during this period. As the figure makes clear, since
IT does not attempt to correct any past mistakes,
they contribute to growing uncertainty about the
price level as we look further in the future. With a
16-year horizon, the uncertainty is considerable: a
95 percent confidence interval for the price level
ranges roughly from 108 to 129, or about 8 percent
on each side of the point forecast. As should be the
case under a successful IT regime, the realization of
the price level is within that confidence interval.
The narrower confidence intervals represent
estimates of the uncertainty on the price level
under a hypothetical PLT regime. In particular,
such a regime assumes that at any point in time
the departures from targets are of the same
magnitude as in the IT case just discussed.
However, under this scenario, the central bank
credibly commits to correct these mistakes within
a year.4 In that case, the uncertainty on the price
level is much narrower and does not increase as we
look further into the future. With a 16-year
horizon, a 95 percent confidence interval for the
price level ranges roughly from 116 to 121, or
about 2 percent on each side of the point forecast.
3 Another argument in favour of ignoring the experience prior to December 1995 is that the inflation behaviour in the initial years of the IT regime
might have still been influenced by the policy steps taken prior to the adoption of IT. But for this reasoning to justify starting only in December 1995,
these prior policy steps would have had to have extremely persistent effects; i.e., policy steps taken in 1991 would have had to influence inflation
outcomes in 1994. However, the empirical evidence does not support this thesis. In fact, it is important to note that throughout 1994 inflation
systematically undershot 2 percent, even though the official target at the time was still higher. If the prior policy steps are the explanation for this – and
since these policy steps were known before the announcement of the targets – it is not clear why the announced inflation targets did not decline faster
to 2 percent. In any case, as I now illustrate, even if the actual price level and the targeted price path were close to each other, as a December 1995 start
date would suggest, that does not imply that a PLT regime would have produced equivalent economic outcomes to the current IT regime. 
4 This is a counterfactual exercise that does not take into account the fact that if a PLT regime had been actually implemented during that
period, the average size of the target misses would have been smaller. Commentary 297 | 5
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Consequently, determining how close the
realization of the price-level path is to a hypothe-
tical price-level target path is not sufficient to
bring out the potential benefits from a PLT
regime. By promising to undo past surprises, thus
ensuring that the price level returns to its expected
path, PLT should lead to less uncertainty about
long-run price levels. For long-term nominal
contracting, this should lead to a smaller
unexpected redistribution of wealth between
creditors and debtors, a smaller default risk
premium and, ultimately, better allocation of
capital. This might be particularly important for
retirement planning or for people living on a fixed
income, provided that there are no financial
instruments that can insure against that type of
risk. However, while these arguments are
compelling from a theoretical point of view, the
literature does not yet provide a good guide on the
likely quantitative importance of these benefits.
Even if these benefits were quantitatively
important, moreover, it does not immediately
follow that society’s well-being would be increased
with PLT. The economic health of society does
not depend only on the stability of the price level,
but also on the fluctuations in inflation and real
activity. Since there is typically a short-term trade-
off between these goals, it does not follow that
PLT is superior at controlling fluctuations in
inflation and in economic activity even if it might
be better at controlling price-level movements. For
these reasons, in general, relying purely on PLT is
not the most desirable way to conduct monetary
policy. How exclusively monetary policy should
aim at a PLT will depend crucially on how the
public forms its expectations.5
Since PLT implies undoing past mistakes with
offsetting inflation movements, observers might
believe that PLT would make inflation more
volatile. But this reasoning ignores the fact that
PLT might affect the way different public
expectations are formed. In a world where firms
and consumers believe that the central bank will
undo surprises on the expected path of the price
level, they understand that they have less of a need
to adjust prices in response to transitory shocks,
especially if changing prices is costly. In this way,
PLT makes inflation less volatile. This in turn
leads to a better trade-off between inflation and
real activity: lower inflation volatility does not
have to be at the price of higher output volatility.6
A PLT policy framework might also be more
effective in preventing and dealing with deflation,
given its better leverage over expectations. First, as
we have just argued, by reducing the need for
firms to adjust prices in response to transitory
shocks and by making inflation less variable,
sustained deflation should be less likely under a
credible PLT. That is especially the case if the
targeted price-level path has a positive growth
trajectory, as we have assumed so far.7
Second, PLT might be a more effective monetary
policy than IT in a deflationary situation,
particularly when the nominal interest rate gets
close to its zero lower bound. To see why, consider
again the case where the central bank is targeting a
price level with a 2 percent growth path. Starting
from a situation where the price level was initially
on target, deflation would imply that the price level
has fallen considerably below the targeted path. If
the PLT regime is credible, consumers and firms
should expect the central bank to engineer inflation
higher than 2 percent in order to return the price
level to its targeted path.
In contrast, under inflation targeting, the central
bank would be expected to bring inflation back to
2 percent, but not higher. By forcing higher
inflation than under IT and, thus, a lower real
interest rate, PLT enables the central bank to
respond more aggressively to a deflationary
5 See the survey by Côté (2007) and Ambler (2007) and the recent working papers section of the Bank of Canada initiative on evaluating IT
versus PLT, such as Dib et al. (2008) and Coletti et al. (2008).
6 See Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2006).
7 Some people have argued that PLT might make deflation more likely (see, for instance, Fisher [1994] and Mishkin [2000]). If the targeted
price-level path was flat, the logic behind this concern is pretty clear: whenever there is a surprise causing inflation to be positive, PLT would
imply undoing the surprise with negative inflation. However, when the price level is targeted to grow at some rate, undoing an overshooting of
the target does not necessarily require deflation.| 6 Commentary 297
environment. Under PLT, this can be done without
undermining central bank credibility, since this
higher inflation can be engineered without ever
deviating from the pre-announced commitment.
Consequently, even if nominal interest rates have
fallen to zero, monetary policy might have more
room under PLT to lower the real interest rate and
stimulate the economy through this expectation
channel.8
But research so far has not reached a definitive
conclusion on the desirability of PLT over IT, and
the potential benefits of a PLT regime cannot be
claimed to unambiguously outweigh its potential
downsides. The reason is that the benefits of PLT
require the public to be fairly sophisticated in the
way it forms its expectations about the expected path
of the economy. At one extreme, the public might
fully understand the implications of the monetary
policy regime for the anticipated behaviour of the
economy and exploit that understanding to form
expectations about the future, which in turn will
affect its current behaviour. In that case, PLT will
have important leverage to stabilize the economy, as
just explained.
However, at the other extreme, the public might
form expectations about the future by simply
extrapolating from what they observe today. In that
case, the choice of the policy regime has no influence
on the way expectations are formed. Therefore, PLT
would not succeed in preventing prices from
responding to transitory shocks, since firms would
not take into account the fact that the price level will
return to its expected path. In such a scenario, PLT
would lead to more volatile inflation than IT and,
potentially, of output, as any surprises in inflation
would lead firms to adjust their prices more fully in
response to transitory shocks. That sort of response
would then have to be corrected by a larger
movement of inflation in the opposite direction. 
By the same logic, when the public forms
expectations without taking account of the
implications of the policy regime, the edge that
PLT could have in dealing with deflationary
episodes disappears. The argument suggesting that
PLT could be more effective for dealing with such
situations is based on the greater leverage it would
give the central bank over the public’s expectations.
But if these expectations do not play an important
role in determining economic decisions, this
channel will be muted.
Broadly speaking, the benefits of PLT over IT
become more important as more consumers, firms
and investors understand the role a policy regime
has on the future behaviour of the economy and
base their decisions on that understanding.9
Clearly, no one can predict the extent to which
public expectations would shift following a change
in regime. To the extent that expectations do not
adapt fully, the policy regime that best stabilizes
inflation and output fluctuations will be neither
pure PLT nor pure IT, but something in between
that offsets, at least partially, past mistakes.10
There are, of course, many other considerations
that might affect the performance of PLT relative to
IT. Whether it is better to think of monetary policy
as being implemented under commitment or
discretion plays a role. When the regime is not
perfectly credible, the relative merits of PLT and IT
can also be affected in a number of ways. But the
goal here is not to provide a complete taxonomy 
of all the factors at work. Rather it is to derive a
better understanding of how imperfect information
about inflation impacts the relative performance 
of PLT over IT.
Are the price level and inflation perfectly
observed?
In most of the research pertaining to the relative
merits of PLT and IT, it is assumed that both the
central bank and the public are concerned with this
ultimate target of monetary policy as it is actually
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
8 See Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) for a formal illustration of the desirable features of PLT when the nominal interest rate is at its zero lower
bound.
9 It is interesting to note, as Ball, Mankiw and Reis (2005) show, that to reap the benefits of PLT, the public does not need to have up-to-date
information about the state of the economy. No matter the information on which expectations are based, what is crucial is that these
expectations reflect an understanding of how the economy actually behaves under different policy regimes. 
10 See Woodford (2003), Chapter 7.measured. In this section, I want to argue that such
an assumption is not necessarily realistic.
In order to implement an inflation-targeting
regime, we need to take a stand on how we want
to measure inflation. But what is the ideal measure
of “true” inflation? In principle, it should
summarize in a single number the effects on public
well-being that stem from changes in an array of
prices. Since this measure depends on the
preferences of the public, it is tricky to estimate.
For instance, consider the extreme case of two
goods that consumers see as perfect substitutes. If
the price of one of these changes while the other
stays constant, a measure of inflation based on a
weighted average of the prices of the two goods –
where weights have been determined at some
point in the past – would suggest an erosion of
purchasing power. However, in terms of well-
being, consumers are neither worse nor better off
after the price changes. In that case, the “true”
measure of inflation should be zero.
In Canada, the inflation-control target is
defined in terms of the year-over-year rate of
change in the CPI. This choice is reasonable in so
far as this index reflects the cost-of-living changes
that the public is experiencing. But for various
reasons, including the fact that its weightings are
updated only irregularly, the CPI is only an
approximation, as Smith (2009) has argued in
some detail. 
There is, in fact, evidence suggesting that the CPI
is not a true measure of inflation. In the United
States, the 1996 Boskin Commission identified
various biases in its CPI that led to changes in the
way it is constructed. But research suggests that
biases still remain, and these seem to be especially
due to the difficulty of adjusting for quality
improvements and outlet substitutions.11
In Canada, Rossiter (2005) estimates an average
upward bias in the CPI of about 60 basis points.
Accordingly, when the CPI inflation is 2 percent,
Rossiter maintains that true inflation is 1.4 percent.
If this bias were constant over time, and the Bank of
Canada cared about targeting 2 percent, one
solution would be for the Bank to set a 2.6 percent
CPI target. But there is no reason to think that this
bias is constant. For instance, the pace of quality
improvements could change over time, leading to 
a time-varying bias.12
But the CPI is certainly not the only single relevant
measure of inflation for monetary policy. The growth
rate of the GDP deflator provides a broader measure
of all prices in the economy, although it includes the
price of goods that are not relevant for consumers. 
In that sense, the deflator of personal consumption
expenditure (PCE), which is a sub-component of the
GDP deflator, would be closer to a measure of the
cost of living. This index referred to in official
Canadian Sources, as the “chain price index for
consumption,” differs from the CPI in terms of the
weights that are attributed to each price and how they
change over time. There are arguments suggesting
that the PCE might, in some cases, be a better mea-
sure of inflation. For instance, it might be less subject
to substitution bias since it is a chain-weighted index.
Annual data on PCE inflation are displayed in
Figure 3, together with CPI inflation. The two mea-
sures share the same broad pattern, but there are still
differences between the two: the CPI inflation seems
slightly more volatile and since 2000 is, on average,
about 50 basis points above the PCE inflation.
The point here is not to argue that the PCE
deflator would be a better target measure. Rather,
the point is to illustrate that two measures that are a
priori reasonable provide a somewhat different
inflation picture. To the extent that none of these
measures can be argued to be superior in every
respect, this might suggest that true inflation is
actually not observed.
Based on these observations, it seems more realistic
to think of the current inflation-control target as an
imperfect measure of true inflation. In this context,
one way to improve the conduct of monetary policy
is to improve the measurement of true inflation. As
Smith (2009) suggests, this could be achieved by
updating more frequently the estimates of the biases
in the CPI, and the basket of goods and services in
the CPI, as well as improving the treatment of
Commentary 297 | 7
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
11 See Haussman (2003), Haussman and Leibtag (2004) and Bills (2004).
12 Rossiter (2005) documents some of the change over time and across studies in the estimated biases. | 8 Commentary 297
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
imputed prices such as owner-occupied housing.
Another possible improvement would be to move to
a new chain-weighted price index.
However, even if these improvements were
implemented, true inflation would still not be
perfectly observed. Some of these suggested
adjustments are based on estimates, and estimates
are subject to uncertainty. That implies that the
price level and inflation are themselves subject to
uncertainty. Moreover, even if we measured what
we intended perfectly, there might always remain
some uncertainty about the proper conceptual
definition of inflation needed for monetary policy.
The “pure inflation” measure of Reis and Watson
(2008), which is unobserved but estimated from
disaggregated prices, is an example of an alternative
measure that is conceptually different from either
the CPI or the PCE deflator.
Thinking of inflation as imperfectly observed
raises interesting questions. Does this uncertainty
about true inflation matter in any meaningful sense
for the implementation and outcomes of monetary
policy? Is there a reason to think that these issues
bear on the choice between PLT or IT? We now
turn to these questions.
What happens if inflation and the price
level are not perfectly observed?
If actual inflation is imperfectly observed, the same is
true for the price level. Rather than assuming that an
observable indicator such as the CPI can measure
inflation, one can treat it as an unobservable
measure that needs to be estimated. One possibility
is to treat any observable measures of inflation as
noisy indicators of the true underlying inflation.
Moreover, one can ensure that the estimated
inflation measure is consistent with theory by
imposing on its estimation the constraints
stemming from a particular model of the economy.
Figure 4 compares one such estimate of “true






































































































Figure 3: CPI and PCE inflation in Canada, 1991–2007
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Figure 4: Boivin and Giannoni (2006) Estimate of True Inflation and CPI Deflation for the US 
(in deviation from their means)
Source: Boivin and Giannoni (2006).
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Figure 5: CPI Level and Estimated True Price Level, US 1982–2002
Source: Author's calculations based on Boivin and Giannoni (2006).Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
period by plotting the deviations of these variable
from their average value over the period. 13
As is clear from Figure 4, the two measures of
inflation are highly correlated. However, they
display some high frequency differences. In the
first half of the sample, true inflation was higher
on average than CPI inflation, and in the second
half it was lower. 
Figure 5 shows the implication of these
differences for the price level, on the arbitrary but
inconsequential assumption that the CPI level
and true price level equalled 100 in 1982 and the
central bank targeted a 4 percent per annum rise
in the price level. The estimation approach also
assumes that the “measurement error” in inflation
averages out to zero over the sample period. That is
the reason why both measures of the price level
start and end up exactly at the same point over the
period. In other words, this exercise underestimates
the deviation between the true price and CPI levels,
as it forces both the starting and ending points to
be the same for both measures. 
Still, the estimated deviations are important and
persistent. Toward the middle of the period, the
CPI level is about 15 percent below that of the
estimated true price level. According to these
estimates, a central bank relying on the CPI level as
it targeted the time path of the price level could
steer the economy in the wrong direction for a
considerable period of time. For instance, in 1992,
a central bank targeting the hypothetical 4 percent
price-level path might have felt a false sense of
security from the fact that the CPI level was only
about 3 percent above the targeted level. According
to the estimated true price level, however, it was in
fact about 7 percent above the targeted path. Thus,
targeting the CPI level would have induced mone-
tary policy to be looser than what was desirable.
Since bygones are not bygones under PLT, targeting
a price level that is not perfectly observed could
lead to sustained and systematic monetary policy
deviations from its intended path.
This example illustrates a potential drawback of
PLT – it might be less resistant to measurement
errors than IT. In fact, this has been an important
argument against PLT. As Mishkin (2000) notes:
“[If inflation is measured with error, it] implies
that the measurement error of the price level is
I(1), and that a price-level target results in
growing uncertainty about the true price level
as the forecast horizon grows. Thus, many of
the arguments suggesting that a price-level
target results in lower long-run uncertainty
about the true price level may be overstated.”
As we argued in the previous section, the key
advantages of PLT are to reduce uncertainty in
predicting the price level in the longer-term future
and to influence expectations toward a more
favourable trade-off between inflation and real
activity. In the presence of measurement errors,
uncertainty in the true long-price level might be
considerable, as transitory inflation measurement
errors imply persistent price-level error. Moreover,
while PLT may have a greater influence on
expectations, those expectations will be proble-
matic. By targeting an imperfectly measured price
level, the central bank could end up creating
unwanted fluctuations in the economy.
But what if the central bank instead saw the CPI
as what it is – an imperfect measure of the price
level? Using a modern structural macroeconomic
model in which they compare cases where the
central bank faces different informational
constraints, Boivin and Giannoni (2008) argue
that a central bank that is conscious of, and allows
for, the presence of observational errors would
significantly increase the public’s well-being
compared to a central bank that naively responds
to the noisy indicator as if it were the truth.
Indeed, they suggest that the cost of ignoring
observational errors might be greater than the
potential costs associated with choosing between
PLT and IT. When the state of the price level is
not directly observed, there are a large number of
indicators that could provide useful information to
estimate it. Exploiting this information can reduce
considerably the imperfect information problem.
| 10 Commentary 297
13 The derivation of the “true inflation” measure is briefly explained in the Appendix Box A. This measure was estimated in earlier work, dealing
with the US (Boivin and Giannoni 2006) and hence, it is based on US data. This choice has no bearing on the relevance of the following
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Moreover, since the ideal policy requires partial
offsetting of past mistakes, PLT would provide a
better approximation to it than IT when
observational inflation errors are present.
Contrary to previous thinking, then, the results
of Boivin and Giannoni (2008) suggest that the
existence of observational errors might be an
additional argument in favour of PLT. How can
that be? By attempting to allow for errors in the
economic indicators, the central bank insulates the
economy from additional fluctuations that
responding to them might induce and which
would be costly in terms of economic well-being.
But there is more. As discussed above, the
adoption of PLT can influence public expectations,
provided that the public understands what PLT
entails. Crucially, PLT implies that the central
bank will undo past mistakes to return prices to
their expected path. But the same principle applies
to past observational mistakes in the price level.
Under a PLT regime, as more information
becomes available and the estimate of the price
level is refined, the central bank will be forced to
bring the new estimate of the price level as close to
the target as possible. That means that the central
bank will be correcting for past measurement
errors in both the price level and inflation, which
should help reduce the overall uncertainty in the
true long-run price level.
The fact that the true inflation or price level
might not be perfectly observed raises important
communication challenges, of course. Indeed, at
some level, it might be difficult to convey to the
public that the ultimate target of monetary policy
is not observed. This could contribute to a
perception that monetary policy is less transparent
since the attainment of its goals would become less
easily verifiable. In that case, this could undermine
central bank credibility. These are certainly valid
concerns that need further investigation. 
However, these challenges are not necessarily
insurmountable. The fact that true inflation is not
observable does not mean that what the central
bank does is not verifiable. A central bank could
publish its own estimate of current and past
inflation in the same way that it can communicate
its forecasts for future inflation. Importantly, it
could also explain exactly how it obtains these
estimates, in a way that the public could reproduce
and verify. After all, the rate of change of the CPI
is just one such imperfect estimate of true
inflation. As long as the recipe for estimating
inflation is known and does not change,
accountability will be preserved
The central point of this discussion is that,
contrary to previous arguments, the fact that
inflation, the price level, or any other
macroeconomic concept central to monetary
policy is imperfectly observed, might provide an
additional argument in favour of PLT. But the
extent of the benefits we might expect in practice
depends on the precise nature of the economic
environment and, in particular, on whether the
public expectations are based on a proper
understanding of how the monetary policy regime
affects the future path of the economy. More work
is thus needed to determine what type of economic
environment better characterizes the Canadian
economy and to quantify the expected benefit of a
PLT regime. However, if we find that we are in an
environment favourable to PLT, with imperfect
information on inflation and the price level, the
benefit of adopting it would likely be larger, not
smaller.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Since inflation targeting has been successful in
Canada, we need to be convinced of important
benefits before we consider moving to an
alternative framework. In that spirit, the Bank of
Canada has undertaken ground-breaking research
aimed at quantifying these potential benefits. 
This research should fill the void in our current
understanding.
The goal of this Commentary has been to
investigate one such feature of the economic
environment that has to date received little
attention: the role of errors in observing inflation.
Existing arguments suggest that the presence of
such observational errors might make PLT less
desirable than IT. On the contrary, this analysis
maintains that if the central bank is aware of the
information reliability problem and takes it| 12 Commentary 297
explicitly into account in its decision-making
process, PLT might become more desirable than
IT.
However, the desirability of PLT depends on
whether the public understands how the nature of
the monetary policy regime should affect their
expectations. To the extent that the research
supports PLT, the presence of observational error is
likely to make its benefits greater, not smaller.
Recent research suggests that ignoring the presence
of observational errors in inflation and price level
could lead to costs that might even be greater than
the relative benefits of moving from IT to PLT, or
vice versa. This leads to a few recommendations:
• Ways to improve the quality of existing
measures of inflation, perhaps along the lines
suggested by Smith (2009), should be
seriously considered. That implies devoting
resources to implement technologies that
minimize biases (e.g., updating the CPI basket
more frequently, etc.).
￿ In implementing monetary policy, the Bank 
of Canada should explicitly recognize that the
actual rate of inflation – and eventually the
price level – is subject to observational errors.
The CPI and other price indicators should be
seen as informative, but noisy, indicators of 
true inflation.
￿ The extent of uncertainty in current inflation –
and eventually the price level – should be
documented and communicated publicly.
￿ The possibility of reducing the uncertainty
about the true inflation and the price level
through the use of a large number of
macroeconomic indicators should be
investigated.
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If no data can perfectly measure inflation, is it
possible to obtain a better estimate of true inflation
than the rate of change of the CPI itself? In
principle, if additional information is available, the
answer is yes. 
When inflation is imperfectly observed, all
observable measures should be interpreted as infor-
mative but noisy indicators of the true underlying
inflation. For instance, the CPI inflation that we
observe at a point in time,        , is the sum of true
inflation,     , plus an observational error        :
The goal is to separate out      from       .
Without additional information or assumptions this
is not possible. However, two broad sources of
additional information can help achieve this goal. 
One is economic theory that provides
information on how inflation should evolve over
time in relation to other economic variables, such as
output and interest rate. Economic theory can thus
provide a set of structural relationships that true
inflation should satisfy and that can be exploited to
decompose           into       and       . More formally,
economic theory provides a set of equations
characterizing the process for     . This makes it
possible to use observations on CPI and the Kalman
filter to obtain an estimate of true inflation.*
Another source of information comes from the
availability of other macroeconomic indicators,
beyond CPI, that contain information about true
inflation. For instance, the PCE inflation rate is
another noisy indicator of true inflation. If both
PCE and CPI move in proportion to true inflation
but subject to different observational errors, we have: 
In this case, the dynamics that CPI and PCE
share must be explained by true inflation. True
inflation can then be estimated as the common
component of the two indicators. By exploiting the
information from PCE, on top of CPI, it is thus
possible to identify true inflation and to estimate it
more precisely than if only one indicator is used. In
principle, there could be many more indicators that
are related to true inflation and using them in the
estimation should contribute to a more precise
estimate of true inflation.
The Boivin and Giannoni (2006) estimate of
true inflation exploits both type of information.
They treat true inflation as unobserved and estimate
it by exploiting the structure of a fully specified
state-of-the-art macroeconomic model as well as the
information from a large set of macroeconomic
indicators.
*For an exposition of this technique, see A.C. Harvey (1990).
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